This paper documents that standard measures of corruption based on the perceptions of experts and opinion surveys and measures based on the experiences of firms can in some cases lead to quite different conclusions as to how much of a problem corruption is in a country. We then show that while perceptions of corruption are significantly associated with the amount of foreign direct investment that a country attracts, the experience on the ground is not. This finding is robust to alternative perceptions and experience measures and the inclusion of standard empirical foreign direct investment model controls. When we look at establishment modes of foreign investors we find some evidence that direct investment that builds new operations from zero in a foreign country (greenfield investment) is significantly associated with the experience of corruption while mergers and acquisitions is driven by perceptions.
INTRODUCTION
Corruption, the abuse of public power for private gain, can impose an additional cost on many transactions and activities. Fisman and Svensson (2007) point out that corruption could act like a tax or on the other hand it may help (some) firms to overcome excessive bureaucracy and red tape. Corruption has also been found to be negatively associated with many macroeconomic conditions, the presence of which could discourage foreign investment. Foreign investors, like domestic investors, will take account of these costs when making their investment decisions.
This paper contributes to a long standing literature that has tended to find that corruption, as measured by expert's perceptions, is detrimental in terms of a country's foreign direct investment (FDI) performance. We allow both perceptions of corruption and firms' experiences of corruption to enter into an empirical FDI model as separate and distinct variables. After illustrating that these variables can tell very different stories about the extent of corruption in a country, we show that perceptions based measures are strongly associated with FDI while experience based measures are not, even when perceptions are not included in the model. However, we do find some evidence that experiences trump perceptions when it comes to greenfield investment.
Until relatively recently, corruption has been measured and compared internationally using measures that are, for the most part, based on the perceptions of experts. However, recent years have seen the emergence of large survey based datasets that contain corruption indicators based on the experiences of firms. While perception based indicators have allowed academics to understand corruption better and helped the media to shine a light on corruption, researchers have long been aware of the shortcomings inherent in such measures. Svensson (2003) , Reinikka and Svensson (2006) , Treisman (2007) , and Fan, Lin and Treisman (2009) all raise concerns that perception indices are likely to suffer from perception biases. Knack (2007) and Kenny 1 (2009) suggest that perception indicators lag reality. On the other hand, experience based measures from appropriately designed surveys can yield "hard evidence on corruption" (Svensson (2005) ). Knack (2007) stresses that survey based measures can "place a greater emphasis on experience and less on perceptions" (p.
257) and that "[i]n contrast to most expert assessments, surveys of firms and households generate data likely to be largely independent from other judgments" (p. 266). Razafindrakoto and Roubaud (2010) compare individuals' experiences of corruption with a survey of experts' opinions for Sub-Saharan Africa and conclude that there are differences between the two and that there are ideological and cultural biases in the experts' evaluations of corruption.
There is a large empirical literature that examines the effect of corruption on FDI, almost always using perceptions based indicators. Wei (2000a) studies the effect of corruption on FDI using bilateral investment data and finds that corruption reduces FDI significantly and substantially. Wei (2000b) finds that corruption plays a role in shaping both the composition of the FDI that a country receives and the magnitude. Hakkala, Nörback and Svaleryd (2008) use firm level data from Sweden to show that higher corruption in a country reduces the probability that a firm will invest there. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) examine the effect of corruption in the host and receiving countries on FDI. They find a negative effect of host country corruption and of the difference between corruption levels between the host and receiving countries on FDI. Egger and Winner (2006) examine outward FDI stocks of OECD countries and find that the overall effect of corruption is negative.
At the subnational level, Cole, Elliott and Zhang (2009) find that FDI is more attracted to Chinese provinces that are actively fighting against corruption. Ledyaeva, Karhunen and Kosonen (2013) study Russian regions and find that foreign investors tend to pick regions that are similar to their host countries in terms of where they are on the (relative) corruption and democracy spectra. A related contribution is provided by Morrissey 2 and Udomkerdmongkol (2012) who conclude that "increased FDI under political stability and low corruption has the greatest impact on increasing total private investment"(p.443).
Corruption has been shown to matter for FDI even when one considers other important factors. Using a survey based measure Asiedu (2006) finds corruption to have a negative effect on FDI to countries in SubSaharan Africa but that countries in the region that attract the most FDI are either resource-rich or have significant market size. Good infrastructure, an educated labour force, macroeconomic and political stability, openness to FDI and an efficient legal system are also important. With a survey data of French civil servants Bénassy-Quéré, Coupet and Mayer (2007) study the impact of institutional quality on bilateral FDI. They find that corruption is important alongside measures of the quality of banking sector and general legal institutions. Similarly, Busse and Hefeker (2007) find institutional quality matters for FDI though they find a weaker relationship between corruption and FDI flows than with other political factors such as government stability, conflicts, law and order, ethnic tensions and bureaucratic quality. Daude and Stein (2007) also study the effect of institutional quality on FDI. They point out that indicators based on expert evaluations on one hand and surveys on the other hand might yield different results. They find that a survey based measure of corruption similar to one that we employ in this paper is insignificant though they do not include perceptions and this measure at the same time. They also fail to find a significant effect of the standard corruption measures on FDI which puts them at odds with much of the literature. This is just a small sample of this literature consisting of the most relevant and important papers. The weight of evidence suggests that corruption is undesirable in terms of attracting FDI, though there are some papers that fail to find a relationship such as Daude and Stein (2007) while Egger and Winner (2005) find that corruption is beneficial in terms of FDI in both the short and long run. This paper clearly builds on this literature by asking whether perceptions of corruption, the reality of corruption, or both matter for FDI.
When perceptions differ from the experiences of firms, which should matter? Should one matter more than the other? These are empirical questions but we can think of reasons as to why each could matter. The experience based measures are probably the more relevant of the two in that they capture the actual situation faced by firms and they are exclusively concerned with firms whereas the other measures may pick up corruption that affects individuals. However, the perceptions measures, particularly the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) which receives a lot of media attention and is easily accessed in a user friendly way, are perhaps the data that foreign investors actually see.
Results from other literatures offers little guidance as to which we should expect to matter. Gillanders (2014) finds that both perceptions based measures and experience based measures individually predict infrastructure quality. However, Aidt (2009) shows that when you switch from perceptions to experience based measures the links between corruption and economic growth disappear (though he only has an experience based measure for 1999-2000 and uses this to explain growth from . It is therefore important to note that the context may matter. Different underlying mechanisms and decision making processes are likely to result in different conclusions regarding the importance and relative importance of perceptions and experience based measures.
We begin by outlining the data used and then show that perceptions can differ from experience in many cases. Section 4 shows that perceptions are significantly and meaningfully associated with good FDI outcomes in general while the experience based measures are not, though greenfield investment may be different. Section 5 concludes and briefly discusses the implications of these findings for policy and the caveats to the analysis.
DATA
In this section we define and discuss our dependent variables and independent variables of interest. Table A1 in the appendix gives definitions and sources for all the variables used in our analysis. We obtained our information on FDI from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) database.
The UNCTAD WIR Methodological Note (2013) defines FDI inflows as "an investment involving a longterm relationship and reflecting a lasting interest and control by a resident entity in one economy (foreign direct investor or parent enterprise) in an enterprise resident in an economy other than that of the foreign direct investor (FDI enterprise or affiliate enterprise or foreign affiliate) " (p.2).
Our main measure of FDI is net FDI inflows. This consists of the sum of equity capital, reinvestment of earnings or intra-company loans or debt. The inflow data is recorded in net terms implying that if net FDI inflows appear negative, at least one of its three components is negative and is not offset by positive amounts of the other components. We also examine the net values of greenfield investments and M&A (Mergers & Acquisitions) sales by destination country, which are also obtained from the UNCTAD database. Greenfield investments are investments that entail operations built from zero, or in other words the foreign entity does not acquire a share in an existing company in the host country. The value of Greenfield investments are collected by fDi markets of the Financial Times for UNCTAD. The greenfield data may include investments that are not qualified as FDI because information on the equity share is not always available. In addition, the UNCTAD methodological annex states that in the greenfield data "joint-ventures are also included only where they lead to a new physical operation. While there is no minimum size for a project to be included, as a selection criteria for inclusion in this database an investment project has to create new direct jobs and The most widely used measure of corruption is the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which gives countries a score on their perceived corruption from 10 (highly clean) to 0 (highly corrupt).
1 The CPI is primarily based on expert views and according to the CPI 2013 methodology the index is based on information "drawn from data sources of independent institutions specializing in governance and business climate analysis". 2 Some of these sources can be based on surveys of "business leaders" in the country but the sample size of these surveys tend to be very small, they are unlikely to be representative, and most such sources only cover a small number of countries. (2009) suggest that "the businessmen and experts whose perceptions are being tapped might be inferring corruption levels from its hypothesized causes"(p.15).
Such perception biases have also been alluded to by other scholars of corruption (e.g. Svensson (2003) Each is somewhat different and thus, if they are in agreement, we can have more confidence in our findings.
The three ES corruption measures that we use are the percent of firms that see corruption as a major constraint to their business (Constraint), the percent of public transactions where a gift or informal payment was requested (Depth) and the percent of firms that are expected to give gifts to public officials "to get things done" (Gifts). Each of these variables takes a slightly different approach to measuring corruption. Constraint comes from a question that asks respondents if corruption is no obstacle, a minor obstacle, major obstacle, or a very severe obstacle to the current operations of their establishment. The vagueness of this question is part of its appeal. It does not ask specifically about specific bribe amounts or frequencies which people may intentionally or unintentionally misreport. Besides this, corruption can manifest itself in ways other than bribes. As alternatives to this measure of corruption, we use two variables that do focus on bribery as the main modality of corruption. Depth and Gifts differ though in that the former asks directly about the respondent's own firm, as does Constraint, while the latter was compiled from answers referring to a "firm with similar characteristics to yours." This is done to draw out honest answers. Thus we have a set of indicators based on firm's experiences that are each subtly different from the others. Depth and Gifts are strongly correlated with each other (0.78) while Constraint has a weak correlation (0.23 and 0.14) with the two other experience based measures. 
<TABLE 1 HERE> 3 DO PERCEPTIONS MATCH EXPERIENCES?
In this section we show that the conclusions one might draw from perceptions measures can be very different from the story according to experience based measures. Treisman (2007) found somewhat strong correlations between perceptions based measures and experience based measures (roughly between 0.6 and 0.8) though he notes that the correlation is weaker if one focuses on developing countries. We find weaker correlations between our perceptions and experience based measures (between 0.40 and 0.52) and when we examine the data visually we can see many countries that seem to have undeserved reputations -at least by these metrics. The figures are divided into four quadrants defined by the sample means. Immediately one can see that there exist a significant number of countries with an unearned corruption reputation either in that they are perceived as corrupt but are not according to firms' actual experiences or are perceived as "clean" but are not according to firms' experiences, with the first group being far larger. Furthermore, it is important to note here that our sample average for the CPI is rather low (3.3 out of 10) since we are missing Enterprise Surveys information on most of the least corrupt countries in the world such as the Nordic countries and New 
<FIGURE 4 HERE> <FIGURE 5 HERE> <FIGURE 6 HERE>
The conclusions one can draw from this presentation of the raw data are that there are, by the measures available to us, large numbers of countries that have an unearned or undeserved reputation for corruption and that there are "reputation blocks" of countries that share certain geographic and historical traits. While for the purposes of this paper it is sufficient to observe that differences between perceptions and experience based measures exist, the existence of these clusters is very interesting and warrants further and full study.
Certainly the existence of these blocks brings to mind the argument of Fan et al. (2009) in terms of the amount of FDI a country attracts. As outlined above, there is a longstanding literature that, for the most part, shows that the degree of corruption in a country, usually measured with a perceptions based measure, is negatively associated with inward FDI.
To investigate the importance of perceptions and experience based measures in terms of FDI, we estimate models of the following general form with OLS on our unbalanced panel data:
where is the natural logarithm of total net inflow of FDI in country i at time t, is the intercept term, is an indicator of perceived corruption and/or experienced corruption, X contains different control variables described below and is an error term of the standard type.
There are obvious endogeneity concerns one might have with this approach. Unfortunately the data is not suitable for the GMM solutions that others have used and it is very difficult to think of valid instruments for two measures of corruption -especially in the context of FDI. This is not an uncommon issue with empirical FDI papers (see e.g. Chung (2014)). Even though the results may not be causal, we think they will be of interest for policy makers.
Main Results
Table 2 presents our main results. The first two columns show that our two perceptions measures are strongly and meaningfully correlated with FDI. 5 The results tell us that countries with lower perceived corruption tend to attract more FDI. The magnitude of this association is similar in both cases. A ten percent change in either index (1 unit for CPI which runs from 0-10 and 0.5 of a unit for the CC measure which takes values between -2.5 and 2.5) is associated with an increase of around 28% to 49% in FDI inflows. This is clearly a very large "effect" but such large associations have been found by others e.g. Wei (2000a) and Asiedu (2006) .
<TABLE 2 HERE>
However, our experience based corruption measures are not significantly associated with FDI in general and the size of the estimated association is much smaller. This can be seen in columns 3, 4, and 5. The remaining columns pair each of the perceptions measures with each of the experience based measures. These regressions suggest that it is perceptions that matter for FDI and not the reality as captured by the experience measures we have. In one instance the experience based measure Gifts is weakly significant and only in one case is the perceptions measure insignificant. 6 This is in Column 10 where we pair CC with the Depth measure. This is likely due to the smaller sample size as when we use Depth in Column 7 with the CPI, the significance of the latter drops to 10%.
Thus, these simple regressions tell a clear story. The experience of corruption, which we have seen can be very different from perceptions, is not an important factor in terms of a country's ability to attract FDI. Even when we exclude the perceptions measures, the experience based measures do not predict FDI. Why might this be? As argued above, investors should probably care about the reality of corruption and not the perception. However, until recently experience based measures were hard to come by while the CPI is widely reported, free to access, and presented in a user-friendly way. In other words, investors concerned about corruption are likely to use the CPI as their metric.
Another explanation is that a given operating environment could affect a global multinational corporation differently than a local entrepreneur. For example, in Russia the operating environment is not the same for all 13 and whether a company is targeted can depend on informal networks (see for example Aidis and Adachi (2007) ). Sometimes foreigners are targeted more and sometimes not. Billon and Gillanders (2014) show that firms with more foreign ownership do indeed face a statistically significantly lower burden of corruption in that they pay less in bribes and tend to find corruption to be less of a constraint to their operations. However, the sizes of these effects are not very large and are only evident in a sample of Eastern European and Central
Asian economies. Thus, we tend to favour the first explanation though the two are not mutually exclusive.
Controls
Having uncovered this simple relationship, we now show that it is still evident when we include several important factors commonly used in the empirical FDI literature. We allow for trade costs to enter the specification as proxied for by the inverse of openness to international trade. 7 To control for market size and development we include a population variable and income category dummies from the World Bank. 8 We follow the literature (e.g. Blonigen et al. (2007) ) and include the sum of distance weighted GDP of other countries to measure surrounding market potential. In line with Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001) we control for the skill level in a country by using data on expected years of schooling. Finally we include dummies for landlocked and island nations to allow for potentially important geographical considerations.
All variables are defined fully in Table A1 in the Appendix.
Tables 3 and 4 present the results using CPI and CC respectively. These factors are signed as one would expect. Poorer countries tend to attract less in FDI than richer countries while countries with larger populations attract more, as do those with a more skilled work force and a larger surrounding market potential, though this later factor is not robustly significant. Trade costs are always a significant and negative correlate of FDI as is being landlocked while the island dummy is never significant. While the magnitude of the relationships between corruption and FDI are smaller than those in Table 2 they are still sizable and slightly stronger in terms of statistical significance.
Overall, we can conclude that the our main result, that perceptions of corruption matter for FDI while the experience of corruption does not, is robust to the inclusion of standard FDI controls. In the future it will become possible, and desirable, to revisit this question armed with the full arsenal of panel data techniques.
However even these simple correlations that are robust to the inclusion of other important factors tell a story that should be of great interest to policymakers. Countries that wish to attract more FDI should, according to these results, focus on improving their ratings on perceptions of corruption measures and not on reducing the reality of corruption as firms experience it (though this is a worthy goal for other reasons and in and of itself).
However, we want to stress that this relationship may change as experience based measures become more well-known. Tables 5 and 6 present the results of regressions using the net value of greenfield and M&A investment as dependent variables with all the controls used in tables 3 an 4. When we exclude the experience measures, the CPI is a significant correlate of both types of FDI and this is also true for the most part when we include Depth and Gifts. However, Constraint is significantly correlated with greenfield investments though not with M&A investment. When Constraint is included perceptions no longer have a significant association with greenfield investment. These results could arise from a tendency for firms engaging in greenfield investment to investigate the local situation more carefully for themselves as they do not have the help of already established networks and facilities that come with a company already in operation. Investors in a greenfield project will most likely need to assess the local risks more carefully anyway as this form of investment is in itself already more risky than M&A. Given that we do not find any significant associations with the other experience measures, it may be the case that bribery is not seen as a problem, or a constraint, per se.
<TABLE 5 HERE> <TABLE 6 HERE>
Thus we have some evidence that the two modes of investment are different from each other with regards to their association with corruption indicators. While M&A responds to perceptions of corruption, greenfield may be driven more by the actual degree to which corruption is a hindrance to firms on the ground. Once again this has some interesting implications for policymakers as there may be some role for actual improvements in corruption to play a role. Countries that make corruption less of an obstacle for firms may see some additional greenfield FDI even if the perception of corruption in their country remains unchanged.
CONCLUSIONS
This paper has shown that perceptions of corruption in a country can differ substantially from firms' experiences of corruption and, as things stand now, it is perceptions that seem to be associated with the amount of FDI that a country attracts in general. While others have shown that improvements in perceptions measures matter, we add a new dimension to the policy prescription by showing that improving the reality of corruption, holding perceptions constant, does not seem to be related to any benefit in terms of overall FDI.
However, we did find some evidence that reality may dominate perceptions when it comes to greenfield investment. We do not consider here whether the experience on the ground has any effect on perceptions measures as this is an important question that warrants a full and careful analysis. However, we have seen that the two concepts are not very strongly correlated and Treisman (2007) has shown that the two are correlated with different factors.
As experience based measures become more well-known and expand in their country coverage these relationships may change but for now our findings imply that governments interested in attracting FDI would do well to improve their standing with regards to perceptions based measures like the Corruption Perceptions Index even if this improvement is not associated with an improvement in the reality of corruption. It will be interesting to revisit these issues again in the future not only due to the fact that the relationships may change but also because the continuation of the Enterprise Surveys over time will allow one to employ methods that can help to make strong arguments for causality. 4 The quadrants on the maps show the most recent observation and a country is included in the map only if there were both the survey and perception measures available for the same year.
5 Our results are robust to using net inflow of FDI per capita as the dependent variable.
6 These results are robust and even slightly stronger when using alternative FDI inflow data from World Bank Development Indicators (WDI).
7 Using the trade component of the Doing Business project as our measure of trade costs as is done in Corcoran and Gillanders (forthcoming) does not change the results. 8 See http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-and-lending-groups. 
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